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Abstract
This paper examines in an endogenous growth theory perspective the
mechanisms through which epidemics a®ect long term growth. In-
vestment in both physical and human capital are key transmission
variables in this respect. The paper distinguishes between Spanish °u
like epidemics and AIDS like epidemics. Two-sector growth models
are shown to better re°ect the speci¯c e®ects of epidemics. The ef-
fects of an AIDS like pandemic on savings and education e®ort are
also modelled via life expectancy. The paper is closed by an extension
of the celebrated Cuddington-Hancock model to account for the latter
features. An application to the South African case is provided. The
main ¯nding points at a delayed e®ect of AIDS on economic growth
due to a the recent sharp drop in life expectancy in this country.
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A few days ago, the 2005 December release of UNAIDS crudely highlighted
that the devastating e®ects of AIDS are still not over, with an increase of
infected people in 2005 at its highest level since the early eighties. The
number of HIV seropositive has exceeded for the ¯rst time the symbolic
threshold of 40 million, due to the registration of 5 million new cases around
the world during this year. While the crisis is desperately acute in sub-
Saharan Africa (with two thirds of HIV seropositive and 77% of infected
females), it seriously a®ects all the continents and countries, notably the
poorest.
More recently, the threat of an avian °u (or bird °u) worldwide pandemic has
put a tremendous pressure on governments and international institution to
prevent the occurrence of another major in°uenza crisis. Indeed, the 1918-
19 in°uenza epidemic killed at least 40 million people worldwide in a few
months, far exceeding the combat deaths experienced during the ¯rst world
war.
The demographic impact of such epidemics being obviously very sharp, heavy
economic consequences are unavoidable, at least via the direct (markedly
declining) labor resources channel. It is also true that in certain circum-
stances, the reverse causality holds: a low level of development and low
quality health services are likely to boost epidemics. It seems therefore clear
that such health crises should interact with the economic sphere, and are
likely to distort it in several relevant ways. The recent AIDS pandemic has
indeed suggested an increasing number of studies aiming at identifying and
quantifying these distortions.
While the operation research and mathematical demography literature has
been pretty much concerned with the optimal prevention and treatment of
HIV (see for example Feichtinger, Tsachev and Veliov, 2005), the economic
literature has been overwhelmingly empirical. Many authors have attempted
to econometrically study the relationship between epidemics (notably the
Spanish °u and AIDS/HIV) and economic growth. The results are still dis-
puted and disputable: some authors have found no evidence of such a cor-
relation (notably Bloom and Mahal, 1997a and 1997b, for both the Spanish
°u and AIDS), while others have found just the contrary (see Brainerd and
Siegler, 2003, for the Spanish °u case, and McDonald and Roberts, 2005, for
AIDS). It should be added that the most recent papers, a few of them based
1on explicit micro-foundations (for example, Corrigan, Glomm and Mendez,
2005) point at an unquestionable negative growth impact of AIDS on sub-
Saharan countries. This seems valid as far as a su±cient weight is assigned
to long term growth factors like accumulation of human capital and its de-
terminants.
In this paper, we take a much more growth theory oriented paper. What are
the predictions of the traditional endogenous growth models as to the growth
impact of epidemics? What would be an appropriate growth model to deal
with such issues? Of course, there is no unique epidemic pro¯le: the age
pro¯le of mortality may be U or W shaped, hitting more children and elderly
or more the working ages...etc... In our theoretical analysis, we shall distin-
guish between Spanish °u-like epidemics, which claim victims in a matter of
days, and AIDS-lie epidemics which evolve slowly in time and are typically
associated with very long periods of reduced productivity and tough and
expensive medication. We examine how endogenous growth models incorpo-
rating human capital accumulation respond to these epidemics. Our main
objective is to identify the growth theory set-up more adapted to treat this
question, and we will show that two-sector models µ a la Lucas-Uzawa seem
to do much better the job than the typical one-sector models. To this end,
we use some recent analytical results due to Boucekkine and Ruiz-Tamarit
(2004a, 2004b).
Modelling AIDS-like epidemics impacts require a much deeper revisiting of
existing models. In order to re°ect such impacts in an acceptable way, one
has to incorporate at least the mechanisms through which the subsequent
dramatic fall in life expectancy a®ects the propensity to save and to go to
school. In addition, one has also to introduce health expenditures and their
impact on productivity of infected workers. We propose a comprehensive
theoretical framework to deal with such issues, based on the Lucas-Uzawa
model and on the Blanchard model (1985). In order to highlight in a much
simpler way the impacts of the decline in life expectancy, we ¯nally pro-
pose to extend straightforwardly the celebrated Cuddington and Hancock
(1994) Solow model, and we apply it to the South African case. The results
are in line with the view that AIDS is likely to have long run (or delayed)
harmful e®ects on growth, driven by the currently dramatically dropping life
expectancy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the study of Spanish
°u-like epidemics. Section 3 is a sound analysis of an AIDS-like crisis, with a
2discussion of the current (mostly) empirical literature. Section 4 presents our
extended Cuddington-Hancock model with the application to South Africa.
2 The case of a Spanish °u-like epidemic
In this section, we shall consider the case of the epidemics with massive and
"immediate" e®ects, like the Spanish °u. In such a case, the whole action
takes place in a very short period of time, eventually ending at period t0.
After t0, the economy comes back to its initial natural and epidemiological
environment, so that the whole story could be in principle reduced to an
"initial condition shock". Suppose that the economy before the epidemics is
laying in a steady state equilibrium, say ¹ E. When the epidemic ends at t0,
the state of the economy is likely to be far from equilibrium, say X(t0) << ¹ E,
but the economy is back to its natural environment from t = t0. Therefore,
the analysis of the impact of the epidemic after t0 amounts to studying the
transition dynamics from X(t0) << ¹ E to ¹ E. We shall examine this question
with some details in the next section. Indeed, the answer crucially depends
on the way human capital is produced in the economy.
2.1 The one-sector framework
In the one-sector model, the production of human capital is assumed to rely
on the same technology as the production of physical capital: The economy
produces a single ¯nal good, say Y , using a constant return to scale technol-
ogy with physical and human capital as inputs, and this ¯nal good is either
consumed or invested for the accumulation of either physical or human cap-
ital. The two capital assets are therefore ex-ante perfect substitutes. See
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), chapter 5 for a detailed description of the
underlying economy.
Suppose now that a benevolent planner has to care about the allocation of
the ¯nal good across consumption, investment in human capital, say H, and
investment in physical capital, say K, so as to maximize the social welfare:
Z 1
0
U (c(t)) N(t) e
¡½t dt (1)
subject to
Y (t) = A(t)K(t)
® H(t)
1¡® = N(t) c(t) + IK(t) + IH(t);
3²
K (t) = IK(t) ¡ ±K K(t);
²
H (t) = IH(t) ¡ ±H H(t);
where H(0) and K(0) are given, and under the positivity and irreversibility
constraints: c(t) ¸ 0, IH(t) ¸ 0 and IK(t) ¸ 0. The constraints on gross
investment variables are the irreversibility restrictions, without which the
optimization problem would result trivial. ½ is the strictly positive time
discount rate. ® is the physical capital share parameter while ±K (Resp. ±H)
is the rate of depreciation of physical (Resp. human) capital. In such a
context, we can naturally and without loss of generality assume: ±K = ±H =
±. U(:) is the utility function, which is assumed to be strictly concave in
consumption per capita. Finally notice that the exogenous environment of
the economy is de¯ned by the pair (N(t);A(t)), where N(t) is the size of
population and A(t) is the level of technological progress.
Some versions of problem (1) are treated in the growth literature. With the
notable exception of G¶ omez (2003), the usual treatment is merely intuitive
and somewhat messy (see for example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995, chap-
ter 5). We shall provide here a di®erent insight into the optimal control
problem, and our interpretation will highlight the role of population growth
in the transition dynamics, a point systematically omitted in the literature1.
To problem (1), we shall associate the following Lagrangean:





1¡® ¡ N(t) c(t) ¡ IK(t) ¡ IH(t)
¢
+¯1 (IK ¡ ±K)
+¯2 (IH ¡ ±H) + ¹1 IK + ¹2 IH;
where ¸, ¯1, ¯2, ¹1 and ¹2 are trivially associated with the constraints of
the optimal control problem, the multipliers ¹i, i = 1;2, being the Kuhn-
Tucker multipliers related to the irreversibility constraints. The ¯rst order
conditions with respect to the controls c, IK, and IH are respectively:
U
0(c) = ¸; (2)
¡¸ + ¯1 + ¹1 = 0; (3)
¡¸ + ¯2 + ¹2; (4)
1Even in G¶ omez (2003).
4which implies that in the interior solution, that is if IK > 0 and IH > 0, we
should have:
¸ = ¯1 = ¯2; (5)
because the usual slackness conditions impose ¹1 = ¹2 = 0 in such a case.
The previous relationships are not surprising at all: when the irreversibility
constraints do not matter, the shadow prices of both capital assets should
be identical, and equal to the marginal utility of consumption. This is the
unique possible outcome in a one-sector economy where the ¯nal good can
be indi®erently assigned to consumption or to investment in any of the two
capital assets. This property has a very strong implication: in the interior
solution, the ratio physical to human capital should be constant.
Indeed, using the ¯rst-order conditions with respect to the state variables K
and H, one ¯nds:
¸ A ®K
®¡1 H
1¡® ¡ ± ¯1 = ¡
²
¯1;
¸ A (1 ¡ ®)K
® H
¡® ¡ ± ¯2 = ¡
²
¯2;
which implies by (5) that the returns to both capital assets are equal (to,
say, ri), that is:
A ®K
®¡1 H
1¡® ¡ ± = A (1 ¡ ®)K
® H
¡® ¡ ± = ri;













The whole transition dynamics of this economy derive from this property.





i at t = 0,
the interior regime cannot set in from the initial period, and some corner
regime should prevail at least temporarily. This is the story told in Barro and
Sala-i-Martin, and much more rigorously in G¶ omez (2003). We shall consider
here the case of a Spanish °u-like epidemics hitting the economy before t = 0.
In the economic literature, the whole problem is written in per capita terms:
even the objective function depends exclusively on per capita consumption,
2It is not hard to see that this property still holds for any constant returns production
function and independently of the assumption: ±K = ±H = ±.
5the population size disappears from the problem and all variables are written
in per capita terms3. Accordingly, the case of an epidemics occurring before




and h stand for per capita physical and human capital. In such a situation,
the economy will trivially start with a corner regime IK = 0 and IH > 0
(or equivalently ¹2 = 0. Physical capital is relatively in excess, the marginal
return to this factor is lower than the return to human capital, and the desire
to lower physical capital entails that the irreversibility constraint on this asset
will be binding for a while. G¶ omez (2003) neatly shows that under standard
parametric conditions, this corner regime will prevail till the returns to both
capital are equalized, which happens at a ¯nite time in this model. After
this adjustment episode, the economy will stay in the interior regime, and





A (1 ¡ ®)K® H¡® ¡ ± ¡ ½
¾
=




¢® ¡ ± ¡ ½
¾
; (7)
if we assume that the utility function is a CRRA function, that is U(c) =
c(t)1¡¾¡1
1¡¾ , where ¾ represents the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), chapter 5).
This is the usual story told in growth theory, and we shall examine it
here regarding two important issues in the analysis of the economic e®ects
of epidemics of the Spanish °u type.
i) First of all, it is worth pointing out that such an epidemic has no
long run e®ect: its sole impact takes place in the short run. And in the
short run, the epidemic is responded by a massive accumulation of human
capital (at the expense of physical capital), in order to catch up with the
interior (equilibrium) value of the ratio physical to human capital. That is the
return to human capital is initially higher than the return to physical capital,
and the more devastating the epidemic, the larger this return di®erential,
and the more intense investment in human capital. What would be the
growth rate of the economy along this adjustment period? Clearly, for a
¯xed level of technological progress, economic growth is entirely driven by
the accumulation of human capital in the short run (since physical capital
is decreasing at a rate ±). Such a short run growth experience could be a
3See G¶ omez (2003), page 368.








the growth rate of output can result unusually large if
IH
H ¡ ±, which is cer-
tainly the case if the initial level of H, in absolute value, tends to zero.
According to this story, the post-epidemic period is rather a happy age with
massive accumulation of human capital, and large output growth rates, espe-
cially if the experienced epidemic is truly devastating and harmful for human
capital.
ii) What is the role of demography in this story? As in the standard
neoclassical growth theory, it plays a fairly marginal role. Nonetheless, one
can get a step further, and notice that the accumulation laws written in per
capita terms, as usual in such a literature, should exhibit the growth rate
of population, n =
²
N








¡ ± ¡ n; (8)
with obvious notations. In the growth literature, we typically assume n(t) =
0 for every t, before and after t = 0: human capital accumulation is supposed
to capture the whole story. While the presence of a nonzero and possibly
time-dependent population growth rate will not change the basic ingredients
of the transition dynamics (notably the way the interior and corner regimes
do occur), since the fundamental equations (2) to (6), do not depend on such
a variable, it may add some relatively interesting features.
Suppose the economy had a constant population growth rate before the epi-
demic, say N(t) = e¹ n t for t < 0. At t = 0, the economy loses a proportion Á
of its population: N(0) = 1 ¡ Á. If the economy recovers its natural demo-
graphic growth rate after the epidemic, we get: N(t) = (1¡Á) e¹ nt for t ¸ 0,
and the law of motion of human capital per capita (8) will not be altered.
Now, assume that the epidemic, though not durable itself, has a demographic
impact: a truly devastating epidemic is likely to signi¯cantly alter the natural
demographic course. For example, it might cause the population growth rate
to depart from its natural value for a while. If this growth rate exceeds the
natural value during the transition, then the pace of the catching up mech-
anism outlined above might well be slowed down, which ultimately pushes
7down the growth rate of output per capita during the transition. Otherwise,
we get the opposite picture. Moreover, such a demographic ingredient will
have no impact on the return to human capital either in the short or long
run because the marginal productivity of this factor is given by
A (1 ¡ ®)K
® H






Finally, since the return to capital is constant and independent of n in the
interior regime, the long-run growth rate of per capita variables is still equal
to the value given in (7) above, which is also independent of n.
Therefore, the one-sector model leaves a tight space for demography to mat-
ter. The law of motion of population growth has no decisive role in the
shape of the transition dynamics. It may mechanically reinforce or weaken
the catching up mechanism characterizing the transition dynamics, but it
cannot a®ect the return to human capital neither in the short nor in the long
run. Moreover, it seems obvious that in such a one-sector framework, the
e®ects of an epidemic are fairly the same as those of a war or a hurricane,
which are supposedly more harmful for physical capital than for human cap-
ital. This symmetry between physical and human capital might be broken
down within the same set-up by introducing asymmetric adjustment costs,
as suggested by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), chapter 5, but such a mod-
i¯cation is, in our view, far from reproducing the speci¯c features of human
capital formation and the demographic interactions. A more serious track
to follow is the two-sector growth literature with human capital. We brie°y
examine it hereafter.
2.2 The two-sector framework
We shall consider now the two-sector models µ a la Lucas (1988) two-sector en-
dogenous growth model, with a production externality in the ¯nal good sec-
tor associated with the human capital accumulation as studied in Boucekkine
and Ruiz-Tamarit (2004a, 2004b), Xie (1994) and Benhabib and Perli (1994).
The main characteristic of such a framework is the introduction of a speci¯c
education sector, therefore di®erentiating the production of human capital
from the production of the physical good. In particular, the education sector
is assumed to be more human capital intensive than the ¯nal good sector.
We ¯rst describe very brie°y the basic model.
8The economy is closed, competitive, and populated with many identical,
rational agents, who have to choose the controls c(t) and u(t), 8t ¸ 0, so as
to maximize the following objective function
Z 1
0









h (t) = Ã[1 ¡ u(t)]h(t)
where K(0) = K0 > 0 and h(0) = h0 > 0 are given. In order to present
some analytical results, we shall assume from the beginning that the utility
function is a CRRA function, that is U(c) =
c(t)1¡¾¡1
1¡¾ . In this model u(t) is
the fraction of non-leisure time devoted to goods production. The output in
the consumption good sector, Y (t), which may be allocated to consumption
or to physical capital accumulation depends on the capital stock, K(t), the
e®ective work force, u(t)N(t)h(t), and the average skill level of workers, ha(t).
° is positive and intended to capture the external e®ects of human capital.
In our problem the representative optimizing agent takes ha(t) as given and,
consequently, the competitive solution will be di®erent from the socially op-
timal allocation. The e±ciency parameter A represents the constant tech-
nological level in the goods sector of this economy. It is assumed that the
growth of human capital does not depend on the physical capital stock, but
depends on the e®ort devoted to the accumulation of human capital, 1¡u(t),
as well as on the achieved human capital stock. The e±ciency parameter Ã
represents the constant technological level in the educational sector. Tech-
nology in goods sector shows constant returns to scale over private internal
factors. Technology in educational sector is linear. For the sake of simplicity,
it is assumed that there is no physical nor human capital depreciation. The
analytical solution technique used in this paper still applies in the presence
of nonzero depreciation rates.
The current value Hamiltonian associated with the previous intertemporal
optimization problem is
H












+ µ2Ã (1 ¡ u)h; (10)
where µ1 and µ2 are the co-state variables for K and h, respectively. The term
ha, as we have seen, is taken as given in order to calculate the competitive
equilibrium. Then, the necessary ¯rst order conditions, under the equilibrium
condition ha = h implying that all workers are being treated identically, are
c
¡¾ = µ1 (11)
µ1 (1 ¡ ®)AK
®(uNh)
¡®Nh
1+° = µ2Ãh; (12)
²





µ2= ½µ2 ¡ µ1(1 ¡ ®)AK
®(uN)
1¡®h





° ¡ Nc; (15)
²
h= Ã (1 ¡ u)h: (16)




µ1K expf¡½tg = 0; (17)
lim
t!1
µ2hexpf¡½tg = 0: (18)
This completes the Lucas model. A quick look at equation (16) is enough to
capture the following fact: in contrast to the one-sector model (see equation
(8)) where population has a mechanical growth on the growth rate of human
capital per capita, we don't have such a feature in the Lucas model, at least
not directly. The e®ect of population growth on per capita human capital
accumulation might operate through the variable, 1 ¡ u, that is the fraction
of human capital allocated to the education sector. Therefore, if any, the
e®ects of demographic variables in the Lucas model are necessarily much less
trivial and mechanistic than in the one-sector model. We shall examine this
issue, among others, in this section.
Before, some early remarks are necessary. First of all, it is well known (see
Xie, 1994, and Benhabib and Perli, 1994) that the Lucas model has multiple
equilibrium paths for strong enough external e®ects. Given the purpose of
this study, we shall abstract from this property, and to make life easier, we
10will assume ° = 0 from now. In such a case, the ratio physical to human
capital is uniquely determined in short and long run, as it is proved for
example in Boucekkine and Ruiz-Tamarit (2004a), Proposition 5, page 12.
Let us denote by ! = k
h, and by ¹ ! this ratio in the long run. Now let us come
back to our epidemic shock: suppose that initially we have !(0) > ¹ !, that is
human capital is relatively scarce after the epidemic. We have performed the
same exercise in the one-sector framework with ¹ ! equal to the ratio physical
to human capital in the interior regime. Will the two-sector framework supply
substantially di®erent results?
i) Having clearly di®erentiated the production technology of physical Vs
human capital breaks down de facto the symmetry between the two factors, a
particularly undesirable property of the one-sector seen above. To get an idea
about that, have a look at the expression of the growth rate of output per
capita in the case ¾ = ® studied in Boucekkine and Ruiz-Tamarit (2004a),














In contrast to the one-sector model, there is no U-shaped relationship be-
tween the growth rate and the ratio physical to human capital. As a con-
sequence, the impact of a Spanish °u like epidemic has nothing to do with
the impact of wars or hurricanes. When ¾ = ®, the growth rate is a simple
decreasing and convex function of the ratio !. After an epidemic (Resp.
a war), the ratio ! is much above (Resp. below) the long-run equilibrium
value ¹ !, which induces an adjustment period with a low (Resp. high) growth
period. The lack of human capital is de¯nitely much more penalizing than
the lack of physical capital in such a framework!
The basic mechanism at work is the following: as in the one-sector model
and for the same analytical reason, the epidemic is followed by an increase
in the return to the relatively scarce factor, namely human capital: wages
must go dramatically up. But in the two-sector framework, the economy has
an additional problem to solve: how much human capital to assign to each
sector? In times of human capital scarcity, the education sector is the more
costly to operate because it is more intensive in human capital and wages are
4The analytical results below are indeed general, see Boucekkine and Ruiz-Tamarit
(2004b).
11high. As a consequence, the economy might ¯nd it optimal to assign more
human capital to the less intensive sector in human capital, namely the ¯nal
good sector, which goes against the catching up mechanism outlined in the
one-sector model. Therefore, the post-epidemic period is characterized by
slow growth and high wages. In contrast, the post-war (or post-hurricane)
period is characterized by low wages and high growth: there is no sectoral
allocation problem for physical capital, and the rising return to this factor
will simply imply, as in the one-sector model, a massive accumulation of
physical capital in the short run.
ii) Let us come back now to one issue raised above: if the growth rate of
population has no direct e®ect on per capita human capital accumulation by
construction, does it matter in a much less trivial, much trickier way? The
answer is yes. Boucekkine and Ruiz-Tamarit (2004b) have recently solved
analytically solved the model for any admissible parameterization. Among
their ¯ndings, they show that variable u, the fraction of human capital re-
sources devoted to the ¯nal good sector, is explicitly given by5
0 < u = ¡








2F1 (t) are two time dependent hypergeometric functions
which arguments also depend on the population growth rate n (see Proposi-
tions 1, 2 and 9 in Boucekkine and Ruiz-Tamarit, 2004b). Moreover, it can
be shown that the transitional dynamics of u(t) converge asymptotically to




(± ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ¾) + n ¡ ½
¾±
< 1; (21)
Finally, the population growth rate does also enter the growth rates of per
capita variables in the long-run, in sharp contrast to the one-sector case (see
equation (7)). For example, per capita human capital is shown to approach
asymptotically the unique positive balanced growth path given by (Proposi-













5Provided the parameters meet some conditions for the positivity of the economic
variables.





¾ . Henceforth, population growth is a positive determinant of
the long-run growth rate. Indeed, while the short term e®ects of population
growth are ambiguous (see the presence of the hypergeometric functions in
(20) which arguments do depend on n), the long run e®ects are clear: from
(21), one can infer that an increase in demographic growth induces a rise in
the fraction of human capital devoted to education in the long run, which
in turn boosts human capital accumulation, and ends up increasing long run
growth. To our knowledge, this role of demographic growth in the Lucas-
Uzawa model has never been mentioned before, which is not that surprising
since most published papers in the ¯eld assume n = 0 from the beginning.
We show here that the Lucas-Uzawa framework is not only better suited to
track the speci¯c outcomes of epidemics, it implicitly and explicitly assign a
non-residual role to demographic growth.
2.3 Empirical evidence
The empirical evidence on the economic e®ects of the Spanish °u (and similar
epidemics) is highly disputed, just like the theoretical predictions are, when
one moves from one-sector to two-sector models. The question turns out to
be whether say the Spanish °u did induce a fall or rise in per capita income
growth in the short run. The answer would be yes with the one-sector model
view, and just the contrary with the two-sector setting. Empirically, the
question is very far from trivial. First of all, one should recall that the
Spanish °u occurred after the ¯rst world war, and therefore, part of the
phenomena that took place in our period of interest is also probably due
to the post-war adjustment dynamics (similarly predicted by both the one-
sector and two-sector models). Second, and more generally, disentangling the
e®ects of the epidemic is markedly complicated because one has to control
for many other potential explanatory factors, like urbanization, the sectoral
composition of the economy, initial GDP and other numerous variables. This
seems like a daunting task, there are however some very careful studies on
this issue. Brainerd and Siegler (2003) and Bloom and Mahal (1997a) are
among the very best6.
6Another related known and even classical investigation on the growth e®ect of epi-
demics is due to Jack Hirshleifer in his celebrated book, Economic Behaviour in Adversity,
1987. Hirshleifer examined the case of the plague which killed one-third of the European
13Bloom and Mahal studied the case of the Spanish °u in India. Precisely,
they looked at the acreage sown in India across 13 Indian provinces. They
found no relationship between the magnitude of population decline and the
variation in acreage sown per capital across provinces. In a more detailed in-
vestigation, Brainerd and Siegler focused on the impact of the Spanish °u in
the US. In their study, the dependent variable is the growth rate of per capita
income from 1919-1921 to 1930, and the primary explanatory variable is the
number of °u and pneumonia deaths per 1000 persons in each state of the
US reported in 1918 and 1919. A nice feature of this study is the inclusion of
many more variables to control for other potentially important factors (like
education levels, initial income, agricultural share of personal income, ethnic
composition...etc...). The main result of their econometric regressions is the
signi¯cant and positive impact of the Spanish °u on the growth rate of per
capita income: \...the °u coe±cient ranges between 0:219 and 0:235...and
is always statistically signi¯cant at the 5 percent level or lower..." (Brainerd
and Siegler, 2003, page 17). And the authors conclude that along with condi-
tional convergence and the rise of education, the Spanish °u does signi¯cantly
matter in the economic growth history of US.
As usual, the available empirical evidence does not allow to settle the the-
oretical debate we have raised in the previous sections. Of course, it is
meaningless to compare the studies of Bloom and Mahal Vs Brainerd and
Siegler: they are applied to two di®erent countries and use di®erent regres-
sion models and di®erent controls. Moreover, the many other contributions
to this topic do not allow to extract like a perceived wisdom. This is indeed
one of the main lessons drawn in the economic growth textbooks: for ex-
ample, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), chapter 5, take the view according
to which, while the catching-up mechanism outlined in the one-sector model
does work for post-war periods (see German and Japanese miracles), it is
de¯nitely unclear that it works in post-epidemic periods. As we will see in
one of the next sections, this question has been also empirically unsettled
in the case of the HIV/AIDS pandemic until very recently. The economic
and econometric analysis of the latter pandemic is nonetheless quite di®er-
ent from the in°uenza case, and we shall devote to this issue the remaining
sections of this paper.
population between 1348 and 1351. He suggested that the plague by sharply reducing the
population size led to a rapid and persistent rise in real wages for laboring classes.
143 The case of an AIDS-like epidemic
In contrast to the Spanish °u, which claimed victims all over the world in a
few days, AIDS is a much more pernicious disease which can be associated
with long periods of necessarily undermined activity and large and permanent
health expenditures. Therefore, the economic theory relevant in this case
is by no means a story of initial shortfall in human capital or any state
variable else, and the subsequent short term adjustment dynamics. The
needed economic theory is much more complicated, and though some very
recent contributions have attempted to capture some of the crucial aspects of
the AIDS epidemics (see for example, Corrigan, Glomm and Mendes, 2005),
much work remains to accomplish. In order to make clear the whole set of
economic implications of such an epidemic, we start with an overall view of
the problem.
3.1 An overall view of the economic e®ects of AIDS
The direct and indirect economic e®ects of AIDS have been recently com-
prehensively identi¯ed and listed in some studies. Part of these studies have
been promoted by United Nations Department of Economic and Social (Pop-
ulation Division). In its 2004 report, this division identi¯es four channels
through which AIDS a®ects the economy (page 81):
i) The most obvious channel is through labor supply which will be cut,
and its productivity reduced. Admittedly, the growth e®ect of such a cut
can vary depending on several factors (for example, the degree to which the
epidemic a®ects hard-to-replace skilled workers).
ii) The second channel is related to the loss of income incurred by families
due to health expenditures. Such a channel can induce clearly negative long-
term e®ects because the nutrition and education of children is likely to su®er
from such an income loss.
iii) Similarly, AIDS is likely to be harmful for investment in human and
physical capital by diverting public expenditures from such growth-enhancing
activities. The Population Division report also points at a con¯dence prob-
lem that may undermine foreign investment, and reinforce the drop in the
investment rate.
15iv) The last important channel mentioned has to do with the probable
deepening of poverty in the most a®ected countries as per capita income goes
down.
Corrigan, Glomm and Mendes (2005) have based their overlapping genera-
tions model on the ¯rst three e®ects mentioned above, with some focus on
the impact of the rising number of orphans (roughly captured by the second
and third e®ects just above). A much more detailed accounting of the AIDS
economic e®ects is performed by Freire (2002) in an excellently documented
study. Freire cleverly distinguished between the e®ects of morbidity, and
those of mortality. As to morbidity e®ects, she obviously put forward the fall
in productivity and absenteism on one hand, and the rise in health expendi-
tures (including the expenditures made by relatives and anticipation of future
costs) on the other. Mortality induce other costs for households: cumulated
cost of funerals, loss of the revenue of the sick persons, care of orphans and
widows, and the e®ects on education and saving due to the fall in
life expectancy. Freire devoted a substantial part of her contribution to the
speci¯c but crucial issue of AIDS impact on the savings of households, with
an application to South Africa. We shall use her results in the last section
of this paper. Before, we shall point at some fundamental modelling aspects
of the economic AIDS problem. Concretely, we will give some insight into
the modelling of saving behavior and the evolution of productivity under an
AIDS-like pandemic.
3.2 Theoretical analysis
In this section, we shall focus on some crucial and subtle aspects of the
theoretical economic analysis of AIDS. The aim of this section is not to
present a complete closed micro-funded model of an economy subject to
the AIDS pandemic, but to highlight the main sensitive speci¯cation issues.
Some computable general equilibrium models have been recently built up to
account for macroeconomic e®ects of AIDS: for example, Kambou, Devarajan
and Over (1992) applied an eleven-sector computable general equilibrium
model for the analysis of the impact of the epidemic in Cameroon. We don't
take this approach here.
163.2.1 Saving behavior
As mentioned above, one of the main economic implications of an AIDS-like
epidemic is a probable and signi¯cant distortion in the saving behavior, at
the level of both the households and the governments. The modelling of
such a distortion at the former level being by far trickier, we shall focus on
it. Freire (2002) comprehensively summarized the determinants of such a
distortion. Of course, part of the story is quite trivial: the subsequent health
expenditures cut savings, and this has a clear direct negative e®ect on factor
accumulation, thus on economic growth. We shall incorporate this aspect in
our analysis in the next section. Here we focus on a much less trivial point,
the way life expectancy (or equivalently, the probability of death) might
a®ect saving. This requires a departure from the standard deterministic
neoclassical model, at least formally.
The easiest tool to incorporate life expectancy into the growth model is prob-
ably the celebrated 1985 Blanchard model. Freire relied on a discrete time
version of this model with constant population, we shall use the original
continuous time version and allow for population growth to be consistent
with the previous section of this paper. Blanchard's model entails a num-
ber of well-known drawbacks, which exclusively derive from the simplicity
of the assumed analytical speci¯cations. Nonetheless, these simpli¯cations
are absolutely necessary to get the impressively clear and meaningful aggre-
gation formulas from relatively uneasy vintage speci¯cations. Aggregation
often yields much more complicated formulas if one depart from the basic
Blanchard setting7. For example, if we depart from the \perpetual youth"
assumption of Blanchard, that it is if we assume that the probability of death
is age-dependent, then the needed algebraic steps are de¯nitely trickier (see
Boucekkine, de la Croix and Licandro, 2002, Faruqee, 2003, and Boucekkine
and Diene, 2005, for some extensions with more realistic survival laws). An-
other drawback of Blanchard's model has been recently raised by Ascari and
Rankin (2004): in e®ect, when labor supply is endogenized within the original
Blanchard framework, labour supply might be negative, therefore requiring
a major restructuring of the benchmark model8.
For our purpose, we don't think this is a major °aw: labor resources impli-
cations of the epidemics can be treated directly on the production side of the
7Aisa and Pueyo (2004) is an exception.
8Ascari and Rankin solve the problem by introducing real money balances.
17models under consideration. Moreover, in the countries most a®ected by the
AIDS pandemic, namely sub-Saharan African countries, assuming endoge-
nous labor supply sounds as a joke! Hereafter, we give a simple presentation
of the mechanisms at work in the benchmark Blanchard model, which is
largely su±cient to have an idea about its adequacy in our context.
The Blanchard model is of the Yaari type: at every instant, a new generation
is born, and each member of any generation has a constant instantaneous
(°ow) probability to die equal to p. Therefore, an agent born at v (generation
or vintage v) has a probability e¡p (t¡v) to survive at t ¸ v. Accordingly,
the probability to die at date t is equal to pe¡p (t¡v), and life expectancy is
constant equal to1
p. An AIDS-like pandemic by rising the °ow probability p,
increases mortality and decreases life expectancy, as observed in the countries
a®ected. How does household's saving respond to such a shock? And more
generally, to which extent demographic dynamics matter in such a story? In
order to complete the model a bit in this respect, let us introduce population
growth in the benchmark model. Let us assume that population grows at
a rate n, with n 2 R. In such a case, the total population size is given
by Lt = ent (with L0 = 1), implying that the generation of vintage t must
be of size (p + n) ent. We have now the minimal number of demographic
parameters to go on, namely population growth and life expectancy.
Each agent of any generation of vintage v determines her optimal consump-












subject to the usual budgetary constraint:
²
av;s= (r(s) + p) av;s + w(s) ¡ cv;s;
where av;s stands for the asset holdings of the agent and w(s) for the (real)
wage at instant s. The presence of the °ow probability p, added to r in the
constraint above, re°ects as usual the existence of an annuity market. All
lending and borrowing contracts between generations are insured by compet-
itive life insurance companies. When an initial condition is given, typically:
no bequests, av;v = 0, the optimal control problem of the agent is well-posed.













¡(p+¹ rs;t) = 0;
where ¹ rs;t = 1
s¡t
R s
t r(u) du is the average interest rate from t. The amazingly
useful virtue of the Blanchard set-up derives from the neat aggregation rules
obtained. For any vintage magnitude xv;t, aggregation across vintages gives




xv;t(p + n) e
nv e
¡p(t¡v) dv:
Accordingly, one could construct aggregate consumption, C(t), and aggre-










¡(p+¹ ru;t)(u¡t) du dv:
The following important formulas could be established by manipulating straight-
forwardly the aggregate magnitudes above, and using the ¯rst-order condi-
tions in the case of a logarithmic utility function (¾ = 1) 9:
C(t) = (p + ½) (A(t) + W(t));
²
C (t) = (r(t) + n ¡ ½) C(t) ¡ (n + p) (p + ½) A(t);
²
A (t) = r(t) A(t) + w(t) e
nt ¡ C(t):
Notice that if n = 0, we recover the results of Blanchard for the aggregate
variables, notably C(t) and A(t). In particular, the propensity to consume
aggregate income is p + ½ 10. Even if we abstract from the consumption of
9This is only done to allow for comparison with Blanchard's model (1985). Recall that
Blanchard considers a constant population size, n = 0.
10Actually, this comes from the fact that the propensity to consume income is the same
for all generations and equal to p + ½.
19health goods, an AIDS-like epidemic causes saving to drop: a shock increasing
the death probability of death (or lowering life expectancy) have a negative
impact on savings, and the more the epidemic is damaging and long-lived,
the larger and more persistent is the drop in the saving rate. This makes
Blanchard-like models most suitable for the analysis of the economic impact
of epidemics.
3.2.2 Schooling
While the benchmark version of the Blanchard model is enough to capture
the impact of a shorter life expectancy on savings, it is not su±cient to deliver
the other implication of shorter horizons, namely a shorter schooling time,
and therefore a slower pace of human capital accumulation. This issue has
been recently the focus of some studies (see for example, de la Croix and
Licandro, 1999, and Boucekkine, de la Croix and Licandro, 2002 and 2003).
de la Croix and Licandro (1999) is the most elementary extension since it is
closely built on the benchmark version of Blanchard model. Precisely, the
authors adopt all the assumptions of Blanchard but depart from it in two
respects. First of all, there is an option to go to school, and the appropriate
budgetary constraint for an individual born at instant v might be written in
an integral form as:
Z 1
v




where R(v;s) = e¡
R s
v (r(u)+½) du, and !v;s is the wage per unit of time paid to
the individual of vintage v at instant s. Second, the latter wage is propor-
tional to human capital, that is:
!v;s = h(v) w(s); (23)
where w(s) is the wage per unit of human capital. Human capital of a
generation v is a function of the time spent at school, S(v), and eventually
on the average human capital, ¹ H(v) at birth11:
h(v) = ¹ H(v) S(v); (24)
11The latter is traditionally referred to as the Lucas externality.
20for example. de la Croix and Licandro found that under linear utility and
linear production function (in aggregate human capital), optimal schooling





which allows to capture in the neatest way the above mentioned impact of
epidemics on education: a higher probability of death, p, causes schooling
time to drop, which in human capital-based growth model is a very severe
limit to growth.
Another speci¯cation of the problem more connected to the Lucas-Uzawa
model could be the following. At any instant, the individual of a generation
v has to allocate one unit of time between education and production (or
equivalently working in the ¯nal good sector). Call u(v) the fraction of time
devoted to production. The problem of the individual is to ¯nd the optimal
production time, u(v), together with the optimal lifetime consumption, in






subject to the usual budgetary constraint:
²
av;s= (r(s) + p) av;s + wv;s u(v) ¡ cv;s; (25)
where wv;s is the wage per unit of time as before. One might complete the
model as in the alternative speci¯cation exposed just above. The wage per
unit of time is as before proportional to human capital, but the production
function of human capital needs to be adapted as follows:
h(v) = Ã ¹ H(v) (1 ¡ u(v)); (26)
where Ã is a productivity parameter. The variable 1 ¡ u(v) plays exactly
the same role as the schooling time S(v) in de la Croix and Licandro (1999).
One might specify human capital evolution as a di®erential equation as in the




= Ã (1 ¡ u(v)) h(v)
¯ ¹ H(v)
1¡¯; (27)
21where 0 · ¯ · 1. Notice, however, that the induced optimal control problem
is much more complicated with equation (27) than with equation (26) because
the in the latter the human capital of a generation v only depends on its own
education e®ort and the average human capital at birth, while integration
of (26) introduces much more clearly intergenerational dependence in the
production of human capital.
In any case, both speci¯cations would deliver the same type of results as in
de la Croix and Licandro (1999), and a decrease in life expectancy should
drive down the schooling time again. It is worth pointing out here that we
are assuming that human capital is vintage speci¯c in both alternative mod-
els: individuals of a cohort born at date v will have the same human capital,
h(v), and this capital will remain constant along their whole life. That is
we assume that all the members of the same generation will take the same
schooling time-independent decision (S(v) in the de la Croix and Licandro
(1999) formulation, and 1¡u(v) in our Lucas-Uzawa like speci¯cations). Of
course, this need not be always the case: the individuals of the same genera-
tion, di®ering in abilities and other innate characteristics, may not have the
same willingness to go to and stay at school, but relaxing our vintage speci-
¯city assumption would complicate dramatically the mathematical analysis
of the models under consideration (see an example of vintage models with
heterogenous generations in Boucekkine, de la Croix and Peeters, 2005).
3.2.3 Health expenditures
So far we have presented di®erent modelling strategies allowing to capture
the e®ects of a dropping life expectancy on savings and education. It re-
mains to examine how health expenditures, which are a major characteristic
of AIDS-like epidemics, may distort the individual behavior. Clearly, health
expenditures might be either public or private. Its is well known, however,
that such expenditures are mainly private in developing countries (including
the South African case studied in the last section of this paper). For simpli-
¯cation, we shall consider here private health expenditures. Denote by mv;t
the medical and epidemic-related expenditures of an individual of cohort v





¡p( ¹ ms) (s¡t) e
¡½(s¡t) ds;
22subject to the usual budgetary constraint:
²
av;s= (r(s) + p(¹ ms)) av;s + wv;s u(v) ¡ cv;s ¡ mv;s; (28)
where ¹ ms =
R s
¡1 mv;s dv. The wage per unit of time and the production of
human capital may follow (23) and (26) as before. Note that we implicitly
consider that the medical goods are produced with the same technology as the
consumption good. Unless one has in mind a critical distinctive character-
istic of the production technology of medical goods, this assumption seems
acceptable. Private health expenditures have several e®ects in this mode.
First of all, they tend to increase utility, just like ordinary consumption (see
for example Corrigan et al., 2005). Second, paying medical care out o® his
own pocket has a direct cost, possibly a double cost: less consumption and/or
less savings. If health consumption is not included in the utility function, a
lower consumption cannot be compensated by the consumption of medical
goods. The second potential negative e®ect on saving is intrinsic and cannot
be removed. Finally, medical expenditures are likely to have some e®ect on
life expectancy. One could model this potential e®ect in many appealing
ways. We keep in mind here that we are primarily interested in epidemic
episodes. In such a case, an individual consumption of medical goods is only
likely to improve marginally the life expectancy of the individual. It seems
more reasonable to assume that life expectancy rather depends on the way
the whole society is handling the epidemic. More generally, since every indi-
vidual is supposed to live in a society and to work with colleagues...etc..., the
main determinant of life expectancy of any individual is the global \medical
environment", and not the individual health expenditures level. That is why
we choose the speci¯cation p(¹ ms), with ¹ ms =
R s
¡1 mv;s dv. Function p(:)
is typically increasing, concave with appropriate boundary conditions. No-
tice that such a speci¯cation generates an externality in the model, implying
the ine±ciency of the decentralized equilibrium and promoting the role of
the governments in the provision of medical goods. This is clearly a good
property of the model.
Last but not least, one might argue that a more intense medication improves
productivity, notably in the production of human capital, that is the pa-
rameter Ã in equation (26) could be made an increasing function of medical
expenditures. Our view here is the following: a better medication by im-
proving life expectancy will necessarily increase time devoted to education,
and therefore human capital accumulation, and this is enough to capture the
23impact of medication on education. We now move to the production (of the
consumption good) and productivity side of the story.
3.2.4 Productivity analysis
The other crucial channel through which an AIDS-like epidemic a®ects eco-
nomic growth is productivity. A minimal set of features to model must
include: the hard loss in the labor force due to AIDS mortality, the loss in
productivity due to morbidity, and the e®ects of (both private and public)
health expenditures on productivity. We shall list hereafter some natural
modelling strategies in this respect.
In a one-sector framework, a speci¯cation of the aggregate production
function meeting the above mentioned requirements is possibly:
Y (t) = A(t) K(t)
® ([1 ¡ Á(t) ©(m(t))] L(t))
1¡® ; (29)
where Á(t) stands for the AIDS prevalence rate at date t and m(t) for AIDS-
related (mainly health) expenditures per capita. ©(:) is a decreasing function,
so that an increase in health expenditures lowers the productivity loss due to
morbidity12. Such a speci¯cation allows to track the three ingredients pointed
at just above: mortality must show up in total available labor force L(t),
morbidity plays through the prevalence rates Á(t), and we have explicitly
introduced the e®ects of health expenditures on productivity. Nonetheless,
such a formulation misses at least three fundamental points. First of all, it
omits the fact that there are huge disparities across generations in terms of
prevalence and mortality rates. Second, it does not account for the e®ects
of a dropping life expectancy on productivity (via education, as repeatedly
evoked in the previous sections). Last but not least, and indirectly related
to the latter point, it does not model the speci¯c e®ects of AIDS on human
capital accumulation. While the ¯rst two ingredients can be incorporated
into the one-sector model in a more less ad-hoc way, the last one requires to
move to a two-sector structure.
In such a two-sector setting, the production function in the ¯nal good
sector may be amended as follows:
Y (t) = A(t) K(t)
® ([1 ¡ Á(t) ©(m(t))] h(t) u(t) L(t))
1¡® ;
12More conditions should be imposed on function ©(:), see Corrigan, Glomm and Mendez
(2005), and our application in this paper.
24where h is human capital per capita, which evolves according to:
²
h= Ã (1 ¡ u(t))h: (30)
As one can see, the law of evolution of the human capital stock is a non-
vintage formulation of our equation (27), with ¯ = 0. It is closely related
to the Lucas-Uzawa framework, and could be interpreted as follows. L(t)
measures the number of workers in the economy, assumed to be identical
in our framework, with human capital h(t). Every individual has a unit of
time, to dispatch between production, fraction u(t), and education, fraction
1¡u(t). Therefore, u(t) L(t) measures production work in units of time, and
u(t) h(t) L(t) measures labor time in e±ciency units. Introducing leisure
would make the story more complete but will not change it signi¯cantly.
In a partial equilibrium (or accounting exercise), (30) should be amended
to account for the e®ect of health expenditures on the education time and
human capital accumulation. In such a case, one might replace the pro-
ductivity parameter Ã by a function ª(m(t);Á(t)) in order to capture the
impact of morbidity on human capital accumulation. Notice that in such a
case, ª(m(t);Á(t)) plays the same role as the function 1 ¡ Á(t) ©(m(t)) in
the ¯nal good sector. If one believes that the impact of the epidemics and
the related health expenditures are clearly not the same across sectors, he
might choose function ª(:;:) accordingly.
In a general equilibrium set-up where the consumption-saving and education
behavior is described by one of the prototypes- here (30) is a re-formulation
of (27), such a speci¯cation is not necessary to capture the decline of human
capital induced by the epidemic, the individuals will themselves respond to
the shortened life expectancy by reducing their schooling e®ort.
In our view, such general equilibrium growth models are by far the most
appropriate to capture the salient growth e®ects of epidemics. And since,
as we have written repeatedly before, the epidemics do not a®ect in the
same way the young and the elderly, a vintage structure sounds as a minimal
requirement. Finally, since two-sector models are more adapted to deliver the
most natural predictions (see our discussion in Section 2), we do believe that
the best and most comprehensive framework to deal with the growth e®ects
of epidemics should be a combination of the Blanchard-like consumer models
with private health expenditures seen in Section 3.1 and the two-sector Lucas-
Uzawa type production structure seen just above. The properties of such
25models have not been seriously studied so far, and we believe it is a necessary
task to undertake. Hereafter, we consider a much easier framework, a one-
sector accounting setting due to Cuddington and Hancock (1994), that we
shall amend later to account for the growth e®ects of AIDS in South Africa
in such a way that the impact of AIDS on savings and schooling is accounted
for.
3.2.5 Limits
Our theoretical proposal has of course some limits and drawbacks. One
obvious limit is the lack of modelling of epidemiological di®usion. In the
Blanchard-Yaari structures described above, every agent has a probability to
die (depending on his characteristics and on the epidemic-related expendi-
tures) due to the epidemic, and that it is the way the latter primarily gets into
the model. Of course, in reality things are a bit more involved: some people
are more likely to be infected than others, it takes some time for the epidemic
to spread over the whole society (contagion dynamics)...etc...Such important
aspects of the dynamics of epidemics could be introduced in the models de-
scribed above either by incorporating some realistic contagion law of motions
(like those typically used for demographic projections under AIDS, see for ex-
ample Wachter et al., 2003 ) or by using some simplifying assumptions (for
example, by hypothesizing simple infection probabilities depending on the
stock of people already infected). Both cases seem to be largely manageable
within Yaari-Blanchard structures.
Introducing endogenous population size is however a daunting task. The
main interest in conducting such an extension is to account for the possible
decreasing fertility of women under widespread community infection, as re-
cently studied by Young (2005) in a stimulating empirical work. According to
Young, AIDS might well lower fertility \both directly, through a reduction
in the willingness to engage in unprotected sexual activity, and indirectly,
by increasing the scarcity of labour and the value of a woman's time...".
Whether such a fertility e®ect could dominate the other potential e®ects of
AIDS (notably on education and investment) is a highly disputable issue,
but one can hardly argue that the former e®ect is a remote aspect of the
story. Unfortunately, such an endogenization would dramatically complicate
the Blanchard-Yaari structure. Easier models to incorporate this extension
are overlapping-generations models µ a la Barro-Becker (1989) with negligible
life-cycle considerations (see Chakraborty and Das, 2005, for a more recent
26contribution). If one believes that the life-cycle aspects are indispensable to
fully re°ect and accurately assess the impact of epidemics on the investment
decisions (both in human and physical capital), then Blanchard-Yaari struc-
tures are the most natural. Nonetheless, putting endogenous fertility into the
model in a fairly acceptable way would require a great deal of computations,
and in some cases, to re-think the whole model (for example if one is willing
to introduce child mortality and/or the speci¯c role of orphans). It seems
much more reasonable in such a context to introduce exogenous but realistic
(ideally estimated) law of motions for the population size under epidemics,
as it is actually the case in the related demographic studies.
3.3 A simple accounting set-up: Cuddington and Han-
cock(1994)
Cuddington and Hancock have proposed a very simple accounting exercise to
measure to which extent AIDS harms (or could have harmed) GDP growth
in some sub-Saharan countries. In their 1994 Journal of Development Eco-
nomics paper, they has applied it to Malawi. As we shall see in a minute,
Cuddington and Hancock's set-up is a very useful tool to get an immediate
idea about the extent of damages caused by AIDS. The set-up is of the Solow
type, and it is based on a simpli¯ed production function (29):
Y (t) = A(t) K(t)
® ([1 ¡ Á(t) x(t)] ¹(t) L(t))
1¡® :
With respect to (29), a new term enters the expression of the production
function, namely ¹t, which is supposed to capture labor-speci¯c productivity,
and in this sense, it could be interpreted just as the human capital variable,
h(t) in the two-sector formulation seen in Section 3.3. Additionally, the
new production function includes a term x(t), which plays the same role
as ©(m(t)) in (29): a larger x(t) amounts to a lower e®ective labor e®ort
due to morbidity. In (29), such a loss may be reduced by medical care. In
Cuddington and Hancock, such a loss is assumed exogenous: the authors
consider all the situations when x(t) ranges from 0 to 1.
More importantly, Cuddington and Hancock introduce the age structure of
the labor force in the production function. Call E(t) the e®ective labor force,
that is
E(t) = [1 ¡ Á(t) x(t)] ¹(t) L(t);
27such a magnitude may be rewritten in a straightforward way taking into




[1 ¡ Ái(t) xi(t)] ¹i(t) Li(t); (31)
where i stands for the age index. Cuddington and Hancock have made further
simpli¯cations. First, they assume xi(t) = », where » is a constant comprised
between 0 and 1, 8i and 8t. Second, they work with ¹i(t) = ¹i, 8t. Third,
they even postulate a simple quadratic form for age-speci¯c productivity:
¹i = ½1 + ½2 (i ¡¹ i) ¡ ½3 (i ¡¹ i)
2; (32)
where ½k, k = 1;2;3 are three positive numbers, and where ¹ i is, for example,
the minimal age to enter the labor market13. Equation (32) merely states that
productivity is a quadratic function of age, and in this sense, it exclusively
captures the experience determinant of productivity.
As in any Solow growth model, the set-up is completed by a a capital accu-
mulation equation:
K(t) = s Y (t) + (1 ¡ ±) Kt¡1; (33)
where s stands for the saving rate of the economy (assumed constant by
Cuddington and Hancock), and with K0 given. To be more precise, the
authors retrieve a term x Ht from the right hand side of equation (33),
where Ht stands for total health expenditures, and x is the fraction of these
expenditures related to AIDS. We shall consider here the saving rate s in
a broader sense, it is the fraction of income not spent in consumption and
health expenditures, which allows us to write capital accumulation as usual.
Using the demographic projections issued by the World Bank for Malawi,
Cuddington and Hancock have studied to which extent the AIDS epidemic
has a®ected and will a®ect GDP and GDP per capita in this country in
the period 1985-2010. The World Bank projections entailing a comparison
in terms of mortality and morbidity between AIDS and without AIDS con-
¯gurations, Cuddington and Hancock have also conducted this comparison
in more economic terms using such a valuable demographic information (ie.
in variables Lit, and Ait). Indeed, they distinguished between an extreme
AIDS scenario and a medium one: In the former scenario, average real GDP
13Cuddington and Hancock took ¹ i = 15.
28growth over the period 1985-2010 would cost 1:2 to 1:5 percentage points
relative to the non-AIDS counter-factual case, while in the latter the ¯g-
ure drops to only 0:2 to 0:314. Concerning annual growth rate of real GDP
per capita, the study shows an average depression of 0.25 percentage points
through the year 2010. Whatever the defects of the framework used, which
does not incorporate (and is not aimed at incorporating) all the economic
mechanisms induced by an AIDS-lie epidemic, the results of Cuddington and
Hancock have the merit to suggest that the growth e®ects of AIDS could
be indeed sizeable in some African countries. In a posterior paper, Bloom
and Mahal (1997) questioned the treatment of Cuddington and Hancock,
and the related studies, on the speci¯c ground of the labor market in sub-
Saharan countries: for Bloom and Mahal, the presence of a labor surplus
could mitigate the output losses that might otherwise be associated with
AIDS morbidity and mortality. Apparently, such a criticism does not seem
to have a decisive scope, at least in certain countries: In a companion paper,
Cuddington (1993) has shown that his results are not that sensitive to the
presence of surplus labor in the Tanzanian case.
A more acceptable criticism would be the way productivity, through variable
¹i, is modelled, only relying on experience. Clearly, such a variable should
also re°ect the education level and other related socioeconomic determinants
(like the gender). Also, the time-independence could be questioned in a more
long term perspective: With life expectancy dropping from about 60 years
to 40, one is tempted to suspect that human capital accumulation would be
toughly a®ected, which would induce a downward trend in productivity de
facto15. We shall amend Cuddington-Hancock's set-up in the last section
of the paper to account for some of the numerous missing links one could
detect in the benchmark. This is precisely what has made it so popular
among the practitioners. Before, we mention brie°y the state of the AIDS
related empirical literature.
3.4 Empirical evidence
Unlike the Spanish °ux epidemic's empirical literature, there is a growing
consensus among economists that as far as one is concerned with the long
term consequences of AIDS, the growth e®ects in sub-Saharan countries are
14The range is generated by letting » and x move from 0 to 1.
15Further critiques could be found in Bloom and Mahal (1997).
29quite important, and should impulse the necessary international interventions
to alleviate the burden of the epidemic. There are still clear quantitative
di®erences between the studies but there are fewer and fewer papers deny-
ing the negative growth impact of AIDS. The unique recent paper arguing
the contrary is the already quoted Young's (2005) paper. For this author,
the impact on fertility will dominate the devastating e®ects on accumula-
tion, and the AIDS epidemic will enhance the future per capita consumption
possibilities (of the South African economy in his case study). One could
question the conclusion of this contribution, criticize the basic (and strictly
Beckerian) underlying structure and the limitations of the data used, but in
¯neand beside pointing at the fertility channel, Young's paper has the virtue
of breaking down the consensus in a fundamentally fragile empirical liter-
ature (since it builds on demographics projections established under some
speci¯c epidemiological and demographic assumptions).
Ten years ago, the evidence was much more disputed: in a highly in°uential
paper, already quoted above, Bloom and Mahal (1997) found no signi¯cant
e®ect of AIDS on the growth rate of per capita income, and no evidence
of reverse causality. They used simple cross-section regression models on a
sample of 51 countries from 1982 and 1992. The estimated coe±cients were
found typically small and insigni¯cant. Such result went at odds with the
results obtained at the same time on more theoretically founded models µ a la
Cuddington and Hancock, which generally predicted a relatively important
growth impact of AIDS. An important reference here is the paper of Over
(1992). Over used a relatively sophisticated computable general equilibrium
model with three classes of workers, and the distinction between rural and
urban production. This ultimately allowed him to study the impact of several
AIDS scenarios, based on di®erent assumptions about relative levels of HIV
infection in educated Vs uneducated workers...etc...In the most reasonable
scenarios (according to Over), the e®ect in the 10 most a®ected sub-Saharan
countries would be 0.6 percentage point over the period 1990-2025 if all
treatment costs were ¯nanced from savings.
More recently, some new contributions putting forward the human capital
channel have found large e®ects of AIDS on growth. For example, Corrigan,
Glomm and Mendez (2005) have used a calibrated OLG model to analyze
particularly the e®ect of the drop in life expectancy on investment, and the
large generation of orphans produced by AIDS. Their results are completely
in line with Cuddington, Hancock and Over. McDonald and Roberts (2005)
30use an econometric model combining growth and health capital equations.
Applied on African countries, the model predicts substantial e®ects of the
epidemic: the marginal impact on income per capita of a one percent increase
in HIV prevalence rate is minus 0:59%. The authors conclude that while
the human and social costs of the HIV/AIDS epidemic are major causes
for concern, their results do indicate that the macroeconomic e®ects of the
epidemic are by no way negligible.
We completely share this view. Hereafter, we show how to extend the frame-
work of Cuddington and Hancock to account for both the dramatic drop in
life expectancy, and for the fall in savings induced.
4 An application to AIDS in South Africa
Our starting point is the following: as shown by many authors, the observed
fall in life expectancy in most sub-Saharan countries, one of the main con-
sequences of the AIDS pandemic, should have induced a decline in schooling
time, in addition to other dramatic e®ects on savings incentives. Ferreira
and Pessoa (2003) ¯nd that in the face of an AIDS-like epidemic schooling
time can decline by half, which is in our view quite fundamental for long run
growth rate. In order to adapt the benchmark Cuddington-Hancock model
to account for such crucial features, we introduce the following modi¯cations.
(a) Concerning the production function, we have considered a speci¯ca-
tion close to (29), that is we incorporate AIDS-related health expenditures
in the measurement of productivity, exactly as in Corrigan, Glomm and
Mendez (2005). In order to capture the gender-speci¯c characteristics of the




[1 ¡ Ái;f(t) ©(mi;f(t)))] ¹i;f(t) Li;f(t): (34)
(b) The productivity variables ¹ are speci¯ed in order to capture the
e®ect of the declining life expectancy on productivity at work. We do this
as follows. Notice that with the benchmark speci¯cation (frefmui1), the
age at which ¹i is maximal is equal to ¹ i + 2 ½2½3. With a declining life
expectancy, such a magnitude is likely to go down, and we simply capture
31this by endogenizing the coe±cient ½2 and assuming the following ad-hoc
functional relationship:
½2(i;f;t) = ®i;f º
¯
i;f;t;
where ºi;f;t is the life expectancy at birth of workers of age i (thus born at t¡i)
and of gender f. ®i;f and ¯ are calibrated16 . With such a new speci¯cation,
the age-speci¯c productivities become time and gender dependent via life
expectancy:
¹i;f;t = ½1 + ½2(i;f;t) (i ¡¹ i) ¡ ½3 (i ¡¹ i)
2; (35)
(c) Concerning the saving behavior, we rely on the previous empirical
work of Freire who studied in detail in a Blanchard framework how savings
are distorted by AIDS in South Africa. This seems to us better than the
treatment of Cuddington and Hancock for this particular point. As pointed
out by Bloom and Mahal (1997b), it seems reasonable that AIDS related
health expenditures will be met by reducing both consumption and savings.
As we have mentioned above, Cuddington and Hancock assume that all these
expenditures will be met by an exclusive cut in savings.
Findings
The experimental setting is explained in detail in the appendix. In particu-
lar, it relies on some well-known forecasting methods developed in Hamilton
(1994) and Gouri¶ eroux and Monfort (1990). We provide here a very brief
summary of the results17. Figures 1 and 2 depict our forecasted GDP and
GDP per capita growth for the period 2010-2050. They are themselves based
on forecasts per age and gender of some key variables like prevalence rates,
saving rates and life expectancy at birth. The most salient ingredient is life
expectancy trends: In Figures 5 and 6, one can see that the series of life
expectancy reach their trough around 2009, with about 44 years for both
sexes, while the starting values are about 60 years. Because we assume by
(35) that life expectancy at birth is a determinant of individuals productivity
16In particular, the double sequence ®i;f is calibrated in such a way that ½2(i;f;t0) =
®i;f º
¯
i;f;t0, for ¯ ¯xed, t0 is the base year and ½2(i;f;t0) is equal to the constant coe±cient
½2 considered by Cuddington and Hancock (1994).
17The ¯gures are generated with ¯ = 1
7.
32at their working age, we get a delayed impact of AIDS, as clearly re°ected in
Figure 1 and Figure 2 for the growth rates of both GDP and GDP per capita:
The gap between the AIDS and no-AIDS scenarios gets larger (though not
terri¯c) around 2020 once the less educated cohorts (due to a presumably
much shorter schooling time) enter the labor market.
More precisely, the gap between the AIDS Vs without AIDS cases in terms
of growth per capita is around 0:1 percentage point around 2010, and it is
almost tripled 10 years later (around 2020). Our ¯gures are lower than those
put forward by Over (1992) for the ten most a®ected sub-Saharan countries
for the period 1990-2025. In addition to some obvious experimental di®er-
ences (coming from the fact that Over uses a computable general equilibrium
framework), it should ne noted that we don't consider in our computations
that all the treatment costs are taken from savings, so we certainly generate
higher forecasts for savings in the AIDS case compared to Over, and thus
higher growth in the later case. Another striking ¯nding is that the growth
di®erential between the two scenarios tend to be stable from 2030 to 2050
featuring a kind of long-run e®ect of AIDS. Of course, such a result is pri-
marily generated by our forecasts for life expectancy, prevalence rates and
savings for these horizons. Since the con¯dence band for our savings forecast
in the AIDS case gets markedly larger after 2020 (see Figure 8), this result
should be taken with caution.
Incidentally our exercise shows that there might not be any con°ict between
the results obtained by authors like Bloom and Mahal (1997b), and others
like Corrigan, Glomm and Mendez (2005) or McDonald and Roberts (2005):
A relatively short term assessment µ a la Bloom and Mahal might not reveal
any dramatic AIDS growth e®ect, while a long term perspective, relying
on the evolution of the determinants of human capital accumulation, might
deliver the opposite message. It seems reasonable to think that the observed
sharply declining pattern of life expectancy must have delayed e®ects, and
the governments should act from now on to alleviate the expected e®ects of
such a trend.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided with a general growth theory-oriented ap-
proach to epidemics. The use of one-sector Vs two-sector models, incorpo-
rating human capital accumulation, to deal with this issue is not neutral at
33all, and we have shown that the implications in terms of transitory dynamics
and the role of population growth are indeed reversed from a framework to
another. We do believe that Lucas-Uzawa model are the most acceptable,
but the basic speci¯cations of such a model are clearly insu±cient to measure
correctly the scope of an AIDS-like crisis. We have provided some re¯nements
of the Blanchard model to incorporate the missing channels, notably those
connected with life expectancy and health expenditures. A kind of synthesis
between Blanchard life cycle structures and Lucas-Uzawa technological spec-
i¯cations, enriched with the incorporation of health expenditures e®ects on
savings and productivity, would be probably the best and most comprehen-
sive set-up to tackle properly all the growth implications of AIDS. Much of
the work remains to be done.
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37Experimental setting
In this section, we present the forecasting and the projection of HIV preva-
lence. The forecasting needed ¯rst the estimation of the parameters of an
assumed model, that is the assumed underlying data generating process. For
this purpose, we retain a Gaussian ARMA(p;q) process for with we describe
below the estimation and the forecasting procedure. Further details on these




A Gaussian ARMA(p;q) process is described as
Yt = ® + Á1Yt¡1 + Á2Yt¡2 + ¢¢¢ + ÁpYt¡p + ut
+ µ1ut¡1 + µ2ut¡2 + ¢¢¢ + µqut¡q t = 1;¢¢¢ ;T (36)
where ut » i.i.d N(0;¾2), and where the vector of population parameters
µ = (®;Á1;Á2; ¢¢¢ ;Áp;µ1;µ2;¢¢¢ ;µq;¾2)0 is to be estimated. These estimates
will then be used to set the forecasting. The approximation to the likelihood
function is conditioned on both initial values of the y0s and u0s.
Assuming that the initial values for y0 ´ (y0;y¡1;¢¢¢ ;y¡p+1)0 and u0 ´
(u0;u¡1;¢¢¢ ;u¡p+1)0 are given, the sequence fu1;u2;¢¢¢ ;uTg can be com-
puted from fy1;y2;¢¢¢ ;yTg by iterating on
ut = yt ¡ ® ¡ Á1yt¡1 ¡ Á2yt¡2 ¡ ¢¢¢ ¡ Ápyt¡p
¡ µ1ut¡1 ¡ µ2ut¡2 ¡ ¢¢¢ ¡ µqut¡q t = 1;¢¢¢ ;T (37)
The conditional log likelihood is given by














In maximizing this log likelihood, we set the initial y0s and u0s to their
expected values. That is ys = ®=(1¡Á1¡Á2¡¢¢¢¡Áp) for s = 0;¡1;¢¢¢ ;¡p+
1, and us = 0 for s = 0;¡1;¢¢¢ ;¡p + 1. Then, we proceed with iteration
38in (37) for t = 1;¢¢¢ ;T. We estimate a multiple ARMA(p;q) model with
p = 2 and q = 2 which turns out to estimate six models, and then select the
model that optimize the Schwarz Criterion. The selected model is used for
forecasting purpose.
Forecasting






where L is the lag operator and ¹ is the unconditional mean E(Yt). The
one-period-ahead forecast (s = 1) is given by
(^ Yt+1jt ¡ ¹) = Á1 (Yt ¡ ¹) + Á2(Yt¡1 ¡ ¹) + ¢¢¢
+ Áp(Yt¡p+1 ¡ ¹) + µ1^ ut + µ2^ ut¡1 + ¢¢¢ + µq^ ut¡q+1 (40)
with ^ u generated recursively from ^ u = Yt¡ ^ Ytjt¡1. Finally the s-period-ahead
forecasts based on the Wiener-Kolmogorov prediction formula is
(^ Yt+sjt ¡ ¹) =
(
Á1(^ Yt+s¡1jt ¡ ¹) + ¢¢¢ + Áp(^ Yt+s¡pjt ¡ ¹) + µs^ ut + ¢¢¢ + µq^ ut+s¡q for s = 1;¢¢¢ ;q
Á1(^ Yt+s¡1jt ¡ ¹) + ¢¢¢ + Áp(^ Yt+s¡pjt ¡ ¹) for s = q + 1;¢¢¢
where ^ Y¿jt = Y¿ for ¿ · t.
Projection of HIV prevalence
The HIV prevalence series take over 1980-2015. To compute the projected
HIV prevalence from 2016-2050, one needs a guideline to chose a suitable
function. The plot of the HIV prevalence is displayed on ¯gure (3). The
prevalence shows evidence of a decline.








1 + e¯(t¡¿) + b
¸
(41)
where ® is the rate of increase at the start of the epidemic, a denotes de peak
value, ¯ is the rate of convergence, b is the ¯nal prevalence level and ¿ shifts
the whole curve backward. The value of ® is chosen so that the doubling time
is 1.5 years. That is value of ® is chosen so that the doubling time at the
39beginning of the epidemic can be ln(2)=®. This means that ® = ln(2)=1:5.
As a result, for a given ¯, we have to ¯nd (numerically) the parameters a, b
and ¿ solution of the non linear system
S(a;b;¿) =
8
> > > <
> > > :





















2 where t = 3:
The ¯rst equation of the system corresponds to the starting period (t = 0
for year 2000 where the prevalence is 0:1916), the second denotes end period
(t = 16 for year 2015 where the prevalence is 0:194) and the third equation
expresses the peak of the epidemic. The value t = 3 represents the di®erence
between the peak year 2003 and the starting date 2000.
Application
Data
Economically active population Estimates and Projections, by age
and sex (1980-2020): International Labor Organization.
The database contains world, regional and country estimates and projec-
tions of the total population, the activity rates and the economically active
population (labour force) by sex and ¯ve-year age groups (from 10 to 64 years
and 65 years and over). These estimates and projections are for international
comparisons and are neither superior nor necessarily inferior to national esti-
mates and projections, which are produced using country-speci¯c additional
information. The economically active population comprises all persons of
either sex who furnish the supply of labour for the production of goods and
services during a speci¯ed time-reference period.
HIV-seroprevalence (percent, 1980-2015): U.S. Census Bureau, Inter-
national Programs Center.
Estimated HIV adult prevalence trends from 1980 to 2015. These esti-
mates were derived from the Epidemic Projection Package, an epidemiolog-
ically sound computer model that allows for a \best ¯t" of HIV prevalence
data from antenatal clinic women who come in for their ¯rst antenatal visit.
40The HIV prevalence is de¯ned as the percentage of women surveyed test-
ing positive for HIV. Each year a national survey of HIV prevalence among
women attending public antenatal clinics in South Africa is conducted by the
Department of Health. The Annual HIV antenatal survey provides South
Africa with annual HIV trends among pregnant women and further provides
the basis for making other estimates and projections on HIV/AIDS trends.
HIV+ (1990-2015): The Demographic impact of HIV/AIDS in South Africa:
National Indicators for 2004. This indicator is de¯ned as the number of peo-
ple infected.
Life expectancy at birth by age and sex (1920-2060): World Devel-
opment Indicators, Health Nutrition and population and League of Nations,
Northwestern University. This is the number of years that a new born could
live if the normal conditions of mortality at his birth should be the same ones
throughout its life.
Percentage expenditure of AIDS in the total health expenditure:
South African Budget Review, 2003/04 and Estimates of National Expendi-
ture, 2003.
Total health expenditure: Health Nutrition and Population.
GDP per capita (1960-2000): Penn World Table 6.1.
Unemployed by age and sex (2000-2003): International Labor Organi-
zation.
The series on unemployment shown here relate in principle to the entire
geographical area of a country. In 1982, the Thirteenth International Confer-
ence of Labour Statisticians adopted a new Resolution concerning Statistics
of the Economically Active Population, Employment, Unemployment and
Underemployment, in which the de¯nition of unemployment is revised. The
new de¯nition is to a large extent similar to the earlier de¯nition adopted
by the Eighth Conference. It, however, introduces certain ampli¯cations and
modi¯cations concerning, in particular, the criteria of seeking work and cur-
rent availability for work, the statistical treatment of persons temporary laid
o®, persons currently available for work but not actively seeking work, etc.
The changes are aimed to make it possible to measure unemployment more
accurately and more meaningfully both in developed and developing coun-
tries.
41Saving rates with and without AIDS: Freire (2002).
Prevalence and selected forecasting results
We now present the results of experiment. Regarding forecasting, we do not
present all of them, since several series are forecasted in order to obtained
series until 2050. As a result we only give some of them, others are based
on the same methodology previously described and can be obtained from
the authors on request. To obtain HIV prevalence projections, we ¯rst solve
numerically18 the non linear system given by S(a;b;¿) for a, b and ¿. We
obtain a = 0:4045, b = 0;0003 and ¿ = ¡9:356. These values are then
plugged in relation (41) to determines HIV prevalence from 2016 to 2050.
The result is provided in Figure (4). There is a clear evidence for decline in
the HIV prevalence.
Now we chose to present the result of estimation and forecasting only for life
expectancy at birth with AIDS for female and male, for saving without and
with AIDS, and for GDP. For these series, the Schwarz Criterion is optimized
by and ARMA(2;0) for life expectancy, and an ARMA(1;1) both for saving
and GDP. Then, for example, the forecast of GDP at 2000 is used to compute
the initial capital in the case without AIDS.
The forecasting for life expectancy with AIDS for female (Figure 5) and
male (Figure 6), for saving (without and with AIDS, Figures 7 and 8 re-
spectively) and those for GDP without AIDS (Figure 9). The ¯gures display
both median forecast and the density estimate of the forecasted values.
18Implemented using GAUSS 6
42Total GDP growth rate, beta=1/7
Year




Figure 1: GDP growth rate
43GDP per capita growth rate, beta=1/7
Year
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Figure 9: Forecasting of GDP without AIDS.
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